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This study explores which factors, given that a terrorist has crossed the threshold over 
conventional weapons and into using unconventional ones such as chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), will determine the likelihood that he/she chooses to use 
C, B, R, or N weapons. Relying primarily on data from the incident-based Monterey WMD 
Database, it employs multinomial logit regression with C, B, R, or N as a categorical 
dependent variable: a first within the relevant econometric literature. Fundamentally, the 
study tests the widely-held—although empirically unsubstantiated—technological 
deterministic assumption that the more readily CBRN technology, materials, and 
knowledge are accessible to terrorists, the more likely terrorists will be to use 
unconventional weapons of the corresponding kind: a relationship hypothesized to be 
stronger for serious attack perpetrators than for hoaxers. Next, the study tests the notion of 
a continuum of proliferation potential, hypothesizing that as states’ regulatory capacity 
increases, biological terrorism will be most likely and nuclear terrorism will be least likely. 
Finally, the study assesses variables that have previously been proven as significant 
determinants of CBRN over conventional terrorism, to provide the groundwork for future 
evaluation of the extent to which terrorists may be induced to pursue C, B, R, or N over 
conventional weapons.  
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Cette étude explore les facteurs, en supposant qu'un terroriste ait franchi le seuil des armes 
traditionnelles en utilisant des armes non traditionnelles comme les armes chimiques, 
biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires (CBRN), qui détermineront la possibilité qu'il/elle 
choisisse d'utiliser les armes C, B, R ou N. En s'appuyant sur des données primaires de la 
base de données Monterey WMD, elle se sert d'une régression logit multinomial avec C, B, 
R ou N comme une variante dépendante catégorique : il s'agit d'une première pour la 
documentation pertinente économétrique. Principalement, l'étude vérifie la supposition 
très répandue - même si elle n'est pas empiriquement corroborée - comme quoi plus la 
technologie CBRN, les matériaux et les connaissances sont accessibles aux terroristes, plus 
les terroristes seront portés à se servir d'armes non traditionnelles pour la situation qui 
s'apprête : une relation censée être plus solide pour des auteurs d'agressions plus 
dangereuses que pour les charlatans. Ensuite, l'étude vérifie la notion d'une continuité de 
prolifération éventuelle, en supposant qu'avec l'augmentation de la capacité de 
réglementation de l'État, le terrorisme biologique serait le plus probable, alors que le 
terrorisme nucléaire serait le moins probable. Enfin, l'étude évalue les variantes qui ont 
déjà été prouvées comme déterminant de façon importante les CBRN plutôt que le 
terrorisme traditionnel, pour fournir un travail préparatoire pour de futures évaluations 
de l'étendue avec laquelle les terroristes pourraient être incités à se servir d'armes C, B, R 
ou N plutôt que des armes traditionnelles.  
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Terrorists’ interest in—and use of—chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are 
increasing. Policy officials and academics alike relate part of this increase to growth in the global spread of 
technology and materials, as well as dual use knowledge, in scientific research and related chemical, 
biological (i.e. life sciences and pharmaceuticals), radiological, and nuclear industries. Their fundamental 
assumption is that this spread in technology and knowledge will make CBRN materials more easily 
accessible to—and utilized by—a wider range of groups and individuals, including those who will use them 
with malicious intent. The Government of Canada’s (2011) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
and Explosives Resilience Strategy for Canada demonstrates no exception: “The prevalence of CBRNE 
materials in Canadian society for use by industry, in scientific research and medical diagnostics, among 
other purposes, creates a significant risk of diversion or exploitation by terrorists or criminals” (p. 2). 
This study will explore which factors, given that a terrorist has crossed the threshold into using 
CBRN over conventional weapons, will determine the likelihood that the terrorist will choose to use 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (herein referred to as “C, B, R, or N”) weapons.  
The policy implications of this question are substantial. In Canada, for instance, policy regarding 
CBRN terrorism is currently aimed at resilience: ensuring that Canada can swiftly and effectively respond 
in the low-probability, though high-impact, event of a CBRN terrorist attack. If there is a link between the 
presence of technology and knowledge and the incidence of CBRN terrorism, policymakers may be able to 
justifiably introduce more preventive measures in terms of counter-proliferation and the control of 
substances and technological information; counter-CBRN terrorism efforts could be further refined, with 
resources aimed at areas of high CBRN industrial and scientific productivity, and weak regulation. If there 
is no link, steps in this direction may unnecessarily constrain industry and research, add regulatory burdens 
on governments, and ultimately be futile in reducing the CBRN terrorism risk.  
Literature Review 
 
The literature on CBRN terrorism is plagued with a paucity of open-source empirical data: not only have 
few actual CBRN attacks occurred (thankfully), but these events are often coded with incomplete 
information. The data challenges researchers face when studying CBRN are often addressed explicitly 
within the literature (see Ackerman, 2009). Koblentz (2011) has even expressed skepticism regarding 
quantitative methods’ potential in CBRN terrorism risk assessment altogether. Most CBRN research is thus 
derived from general secondary sources on terrorism, or focused on anecdotal case studies. The 1995 sarin 
gas attacks in Tokyo and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States are the usual subjects of these studies. 
It appears that the only relevant study to have applied a rigorous multi-case methodology addresses only 
chemical and biological weapons (Tucker, 2000).  
A major divide within the literature exists between those who dramatize the risk of CBRN 
terrorism, usually on the assumed premise that CBRN attacks will increase as technology and knowledge 
become more globalized in nature, and those who seek to devalue such arguments, usually based on CBRN 
terrorism’s sparse historical record. Still, the historical record shows that many terrorist groups have used 
and considered using CBRN weapons, and there is seeming near-consensus that technology diffusion will 
make it easier and, thus, potentially more attractive to pursue CBRN capabilities.  
This “technological determinism,” a term first developed with respect to nuclear proliferation 
among states, is carried through to weapon-type-specific analyses (that is, works that focus on only one 
weapon type: C, B, R, or N). For example, Amy Smithson (2009) explores case study analyses of chemical 
terrorism, describing the technical advances that may facilitate chemical weapons’ proliferation to terrorist 
groups and lone actors; she specifically notes the industry’s growth in the southern hemisphere and suggests 
that terrorists will become increasingly likely to acquire access to—and knowledge of—chemicals that can 
be used in attacks. The United States’ Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their 
Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats (2006) makes a parallel argument with respect to the 
dispersion of life sciences-related knowledge and technological expertise, and the incidence of biological 
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terrorism. Ferguson and Potter (2004) make similar arguments with respect to nuclear terrorism, identifying 
ways in which terrorists can exploit military and civilian nuclear assets. It should be noted that while 
Ferguson and Potter’s discussion is framed in terms of nuclear terrorism, two of the authors’ four scenarios 
involve the emission or dispersion of radioactive materials (i.e. radiological terrorism), not nuclear 
explosions (nuclear terrorism). 
Technological determinism is mediated by states’ capacity to regulate relevant materials and 
knowledge. To this end, the Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application 
to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats (2006) contributes the concept of a “continuum of proliferation 
potential” (pp. 53-58). According to this continuum, the correlation between the use of a C, B, R, or N 
weapon and its related technological base is strongest for nuclear terrorism and weakens as one moves to 
chemical, then radiological, and ultimately biological terrorism, because nonproliferation control regimes 
become increasingly weak as one progresses along the continuum.  
The majority of existing research seeks to distinguish CBRN terrorist events from conventional 
ones, developing profiles of CBRN attackers and of likely venues. Only a notable few, however, employ 
econometric techniques. For instance, Coyle (2012) tests whether economic development and political risk 
indicators commonly used to analyze conventional terrorism apply to CBRN terrorism; and Rowlands, 
Littlewood, and Kilberg (2012) contribute a set of CBRN-versus-conventional explanatory variables related 
to terrorist group organizational structure, coded in a dataset developed at Carleton University (Kilberg, 
2011). They also describe differences between hoaxes and non-hoaxes, finding that hoaxes are twice as 
likely to be perpetrated by individuals than by terrorist groups, and that different motivations and group 
organizational structures—most strongly religious motivation and “hub-spoke” organization—contribute 
to a group’s likelihood to perpetrate hoaxes over serious attacks. Both of these studies include data from 
the Monterey Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Database (Monterey Terrorism Research and 
Education Program, 2010)—the most comprehensive open-source data set on CBRN terrorism events—
and the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2011), which includes both conventional and unconventional attacks. 
In a project more proximate to this study’s aims, Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer (2012) explain 
the incidence of CBRN terrorism using three sets of variables: environmental, organizational, and intrinsic. 
Among the environmental variables, the level of a host state’s technological development (proxied by 
energy consumption per capita), although hypothesized to be a positive predictor of CBRN terrorism, was 
found to be insignificant; the authors performed multiple tests to examine if their proxy was simply a poor 
measure, but they failed to uncover any significant predictors. The degree of the host country’s 
embeddedness in the global economy was a significant positive predictor of CBRN terrorism. The authors 
concluded that the hypothesized effect of technological development must be incorporated within the 
economic embeddedness effect; that a globalized and networked world makes a country’s level of 
development unlikely to affect a terrorist’s decision to use CBRN weapons.  
In their first of two studies, Ivanova and Sandler (2006) use an odds ratio methodology to 
demonstrate a statistical association between the use of CBRN terrorism and political regime 
characteristics; group motives and structure; and certain factors relating to target choice. They also produce 
initial negative binomial regression results, which indicate that regime characteristics can generate causal 
explanations for the number of CBRN terrorist events a country experiences. Among these characteristics, 
democracy, strong rule of law, and high wealth (measured as the log of per capita income) are all found to 
be significant positive determinants of the number of CBRN over conventional attacks. Honesty (the 
absence of corruption) is found to have a significant negative influence. While each of these variables’ 
coefficients was strongly significant, their magnitudes were of varying practical relevance. Like the studies 
described above, these authors use data from the Monterey WMD Database for their dependent variable, 
but they significantly reduce the scope of the database’s observations in order to better align with their 
definition of terrorism and the period under study, which was limited to 1988-2004 due to data availability 
for their independent variables. Notably, the authors eliminated purely criminally-motivated attacks, along 
with hoaxes, pranks, and threats where the actors do not actually possess CBRN agents from the sample. 
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In a follow-up study, Ivanova and Sandler (2007) introduce three negative binomial regression 
models to test the direction of causality of their odds ratio findings from the previous year. In addition to 
their already-tested significant independent variables, the authors investigate whether past CBRN incidents 
are a determinant of future attacks. Of all the variables examined, they find that past CBRN incidents have 
the largest marginal impact on the likelihood of future attacks. These findings confirm the notion that once 
terrorists cross the CBRN threshold, they are likely to continue, due to economies of scale, diminished “set-
up” costs over time, and the success of their tactics.  
This present study contributes to the literature by empirically testing, for the first time, the widely 
held technological deterministic assumption that CBRN use by terrorists is inevitable, given the spread of 
technology and knowledge in related fields, and given that existing weapons may be proliferated to terrorist 
groups. By using a categorical dependent variable (splitting the usual incidence of CBRN terrorism as a 
unit into the incidence of C, B, R, or N terrorism events considered separately—also a first in the 
econometric literature), this study nuances Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer’s (2012) broad-based use of 
technological development as an explanatory variable for the incidence of CBRN terrorism writ large. In 
addition to adding five years’ worth of observations, this study also presents a refinement to Ivanova and 
Sandler’s (2006, 2007) findings that high national wealth increases the likelihood of CBRN terrorism; it 
may be that per capita income is a confounding or intervening variable, for which the true source is a large 
C, B, R, or N industry. To this effect, this study rescales Coyle’s (2012) application of proven econometric 
descriptors for conventional terrorism to CBRN terrorism, by testing previously demonstrated determinants 
of CBRN over conventional weapons across C, B, R, or N outcomes. This study also tests the utility of 
Ivanova and Sandler’s (2006, 2007) culling of their dataset, by contributing industry-related variables to 
Rowlands, Littlewood, and Kilberg’s (2012) discussion of the differences between characteristics of hoaxes 
and non-hoaxes.  
Conceptual Framework 
 
Weapon Type and Related Industry: The Technological Determinist Argument 
 
The conventional wisdom regarding CBRN terrorism puts forth a widely-accepted assumption to explain 
variation in terrorists’ use of C, B, R, or N weapons: the more readily C, B, R, or N technology, materials, 
and knowledge are accessible to terrorists, the more likely terrorists will be to use unconventional weapons 
of the corresponding kind. For instance, a large chemical industrial base in a country would lead to a greater 
likelihood of chemical terrorism there. Likewise, a country’s lack of nuclear technology and knowledge 
would decrease its likelihood of experiencing nuclear terrorism.  
 
Hypothesis 1A: Terrorist attacks using a particular weapon type will be most likely when the 
industry corresponding to that weapon within the country of attack is relatively large.  
 
If Hypothesis 1A is confirmed, the relationship should be stronger for serious attack perpetrators, who rely 
on the presence and use of actual CBRN agents, than for hoaxers and pranksters, who are not limited by 
material constraints. 
 
Hypothesis 1B: Related industry will have a greater influence on the weapon choice of serious 
attack perpetrators than of hoaxers or pranksters. 
Regulatory Capacity and Proliferation Potential 
 
Based on the notion of a continuum of proliferation potential (Committee on Advances in Technology and 
the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, 2006, pp. 53-58), the 
correlation between the use of a C, B, R, or N weapon and its related technological base is hypothesized to 
be strongest for nuclear terrorism and gradually weakens as one moves to chemical, then radiological, and 
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ultimately biological terrorism, since industry regulation becomes increasingly difficult as one moves along 
the continuum. In controlling for states’ regulatory capacity, this study will provide insight into the validity 
of the proliferation continuum hypothesis, while allowing for a ceteris paribus assessment of the effect of 
C, B, R, or N industry on terrorists’ weapon choice. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As states’ regulatory capacity increases (decreases), terrorists will most (least) 
frequently use those CBRN agents that are most (least) difficult to regulate. 
Determinants of CBRN Over Conventional Weapons 
 
In probing the supposed link between industry and related weapon-type, this study provides the groundwork 
for future evaluation of the extent to which terrorists may be induced to pursue C, B, R, or N over 
conventional weapons. To this end, it includes the variables that are—as demonstrated in previous studies 
discussed in the literature review—significant determinants of CBRN over conventional terrorism. While 
it is expected that these variables will have little if any independent effect on the likelihood of C, B, R, or 
N attacks, a failure to control for them might skew the findings of key explanatory variables.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Regime and perpetrator characteristics previously identified as significant 
determinants of CBRN over conventional weapons will not be significant determinants of the 
likelihood of C, B, R, or N. 
 
This study does not address directly why a terrorist would choose to pursue CBRN over conventional 
weapons, as such an analysis would require the inclusion of data regarding conventional (i.e. non-CBRN) 
terrorist attacks. Although doing so would generate wider variation along the dependent variable, it would 
likely obscure weapon-type-specific nuances, as each of the CBRN weapon types would be dwarfed in 
relation to the total sample. 
The Data 
 
The Sample and the Dependent Variable: Weapon Type Used in Attack 
 
This study’s unit of analysis is terrorist events in which C, B, R, or N weapons were used; each observation 
thus represents a C, B, R, or N terrorism incident. To measure the dependent variable—named 
“weapontype”—this study relies on the incident-based Monterey WMD Database’s (Monterey Terrorism 
Research and Education Program, 2012) coding of primary weapon type, a categorical variable which 
describes the first attack weapon as biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, or unknown. 
While the Monterey WMD Database contains 1,729 such incidents between 1933 and 2012, the 
sample used in this study includes 1,431 observations from the period 1990 to 2011. The sample is reduced 
due to the availability of additional variables, and the removal of observations for which the country of 
attack and primary weapon type were either un-coded or unknown. The remaining sample, described in 
Table 1, thus covers a 21-year period (1990-2011), with observations spanning 90 different countries. Since 
most of the key explanatory variables (described below) are relatively stable within each country from year 
to year, variation in the type of CBRN weapon used is expected to emerge primarily from differences across 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for weapontype: C, B, R, or N 
 
Weapon Frequency Percent 
Biological 815 56.95 
Chemical 482 33.68 
Nuclear 42 2.94 
Radiological 92 6.43 
Total 1,431 100.00 
 
Observations are not culled as per Ivanova and Sandler’s (2006; 2007) strict requirements. Hoaxes 
are retained in the sample because “they cause disruption, panic, thicken security barriers and take resources 
away from other threats” even if they do not involve a “human toll” (Rowlands, Littlewood, and Kilberg, 
2012, 34). Criminally-motivated attacks are also retained since they are theoretically no less liable than 
politically- or ideologically-motivated incidents to generate human tolls, panic, disruption, and security 
responses. Rowlands, Littlewood, and Kilberg (2012) and Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer (2012) 
similarly retain criminally-motivated attacks. 
 
Measures of Related Industry 
 
Measures of CBRN-related industry (summary statistics presented in Appendix, Table A1) are the primary 
explanatory variables required for testing the technological determinism argument.  
Measures of biological industry, bioindustry, and chemical industry, chemindustry, are both 
sourced from the World Trade Organization’s (2012) “Time Series on International Trade.” Bioindustry is 
a continuous variable that measures the value of a country’s annual pharmaceutical exports, in US dollars 
at current prices, as an indicator of a country’s domestic production capacity in the life sciences (i.e. 
“biological” industry) and associated knowledge thereof. Chemindustry is a continuous variable that 
measures a country’s annual chemical exports minus its pharmaceutical exports, also in US dollars at 
current prices. It serves as a proxy measure for a country’s domestic production capacity in the chemical 
industry and associated knowledge thereof. 
Relying on exports as a measure of production capacity presents a major limitation to this data, 
given that some countries may both produce and use their chemicals and pharmaceuticals domestically; 
export data will thus understate these countries’ production capacity. However, exports are stronger than 
other trade measures, since including imports (although this would reflect the presence of CBRN agents in 
a given country) would presumably inflate domestic know-how and technology. Using pharmaceuticals as 
a proxy for life sciences presents a further challenge. First, pharmaceuticals are actually listed by the World 
Trade Organization (2012) as a subset of chemical products, and thus—even though they reflect life 
sciences advancements—are partially correlated with chemical industry advancement. Second, this rather 
narrow measure is likely to underestimate the true scope and size of biologically-related industry. 
Furthermore, the World Trade Organization does not distinguish between 0 values (i.e. a country does not 
export any pharmaceutical or chemical products) and missing values (i.e. the country did not report such 
exports). As a result, all 0 and missing values have been recorded as missing values in this sample, which 
may underestimate the influence of a related domestic production capacity, and may also be symptomatic 
of a structural bias against those few countries that fail to report their exports. Despite these weaknesses, 
these industry measures are used here since they appear to be the strongest publicly available proxies, 
covering the widest range of countries and years. Alternate measures, such as data collected for OECD 
countries, would limit the utility of industry variables in explaining variation in terrorists’ choice in weapon, 
since there is likely little variation in terms of industry size across this group of countries. 
Since the sources of radiological terrorism identified by Ferguson and Potter (2004) emanate from 
nuclear energy facilities, the size of “radiological industry” will be proxied by radindustry: a continuous, 
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absolute measure in kilowatt-hours of a country’s annual nuclear electricity production, as measured by the 
World Bank’s (2012) “World Development Indicators.” The employment of electricity production rather 
than electricity use emphasizes a country’s domestic production capacity and associated knowledge thereof, 
rather than mere presence of agents. Unfortunately, a more precise or alternate measure of “radiological 
industry” is impossible to quantify exhaustively, given that radioactive materials can be acquired in varying 
quantities from such wide-ranging sources as hospitals, science labs, and even every-day commodities such 
as tritium exit signs. Nuclear “industry,” nuclearindustry, is proxied by a dummy variable that differentiates 
countries that possess weapons-usable nuclear materials from those that do not, as identified by the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI)’s (2012) “Nuclear Materials Security Index.”  
Measures of States’ Regulatory Capacity 
 
Two variables are used to measure a state’s capacity to regulate or control C, B, R, or N industries (summary 
statistics presented in Appendix, Table A2). The first, industryreg, is the NTI’s (2012) coding, on a scale 
of 0 to 100, of the degree to which countries have implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1540, which obliges states to implement domestic legislation regarding WMD materials security. 
While this measure only exists as of UNSCR 1540’s pronouncement in 2004, industryreg is applied here 
as a standard score per country since 1990, since it is likely that the resolution’s implementation reflects a 
pre-existing commitment to WMD materials security and state capacity to that effect. 
The second proxy measure is the Political Risk Services Group’s (2012) “International Country 
Risk Guide” coding of bureaucratic quality, bureauqual. Measured on a four-point scale, bureauqual 
reflects the strength of a country’s bureaucracy and its capacity to withstand governmental changes and 
maintain political autonomy. A limitation to the bureauqual measure is that it pertains only to a general 
quality of states that is likely to affect the state’s regulatory capacity; it is not linked directly to regulation 
or any specific industries. It is used nonetheless, since it captures variation within countries over time, 
which the industry-specific industryreg measure does not. 
Measures of Previously-Identified Controls 
 
These variables (summary statistics presented in Appendix, Table A3) have been collected based on 
previous studies' findings and, where possible, using the same sources (summarized in Appendix, Table 
A4).  
 Country-specific controls—gdppc and techdev—are sourced from the World Bank’s (2012) “World 
Bank Development Indicators.” Gdppc, as a proxy for a country’s overall wealth, measures a country’s 
GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars, for the country and year in which an attack 
occurred. Techdev, as a proxy of a country’s technological development, measures total energy 
consumption (megagrams of oil equivalent) per capita, in the country and year of attack.  
 Regime-specific controls measure levels of democracy (polity2) and corruption (corruption). 
Polity2 is the Polity Project’s (Marshall and Jaggers 2011) “revised combined polity score.” An ordinal 
variable with values ranging from -10 to +10, it represents a sum of Polity’s “institutionalized democracy” 
and “institutionalized autocracy” scores. Corruption is an ordinal variable with values ranging from 0 to 6, 
as coded by the Political Risk Services Group’s (2012) “International Country Risk Guide.” It measures 
corruption within a state’s political system, emphasizing actual or potential nepotism, overinvolved 
patronage, secret funding deals, and suspicious links between business and politics.  
 Two perpetrator-specific variables are coded. Religious motivation, religious, is a dummy 
variable—coded here by Kilberg (2011)—that identifies those attacks perpetrated by religiously-motivated 
terrorist groups. Transnational orientation, transnational, is a dummy variable that identifies those attacks 
perpetrated by transnationally-oriented (as opposed to domestically-oriented) terrorist groups. It is coded 
here according to the method prescribed in Ivanova and Sandler (2007): if the perpetrator group is also 
identified in the “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE): 1968-2006” dataset 
(Mickolus et al., 2006), it is assumed to have a transnational orientation and thus coded as 1. If the 
CGJSC / RCESSC  59 
Vol. 2, Iss/Num. 2, Fall/Automne 2013 
 
perpetrator group is not named in ITERATE, or if the perpetrator is a lone wolf or unidentified, it is coded 
as 0. 
Econometric Models and Estimation Methods 
 
A multinomial logit regression is employed to test the influence of the above-defined independent variables, 
described in Table 2, on the categorical dependent variable, weapontype. Here, the variables predict the 
likelihoods of four possible, non-orderable, nominal outcomes—C, B, R, or N terrorism incidents—relative 
to a base outcome. In this study, unless otherwise specified, the base outcome used for interpretation and 
the presentation of results is biological incidents. Since each outcome in a multinomial logit regression 
signifies its likelihood relative to a given base outcome, the model’s “coefficients” are presented as relative-
risk ratios (RRRs). The RRR illustrates the influence of the explanatory variable on the likelihood of an 
outcome relative to the base case. 
Two general multinomial logit models are tested. Model 1 addresses measures of states’ regulatory 
capacity (x5 and x6), and characteristics specific to perpetrators (x7 and x8), regimes (x3 and x4), and countries 
(x1 and x2) that have been previously identified as determinants of CBRN over conventional terrorism:  
 
weapontype = β0 + β1gdppc1 + β2techdev2 + β3log(polity2)3 + β4corruption4 + 
β5bureauqual5 + β6industryreg6 + β7transnational7 + β8religious8 +μ 
(1) 
 
Model 2 adds industry-specific variables (x9, x10 and x11) to the previous model: 
 
weapontype = β0 + β1gdppc1 + β2techdev2 + β3log(polity2)3 + β4corruption4 + 
β5bureauqual5 + β6industryreg6 + β7transnational7 + β8religious8 + 




These models include most variables in their absolute form described in the previous section, except 
for polity2 and the two industry ratios. The log of polity2 is taken to narrow the variable’s range, and make 
it less sensitive to an abundance of high scores (72.83% of observations scored 10 in polity2). Instead of 
absolute measures of industry size, ratios are taken of both radindustry and chemindustry to bioindustry to 
capture variation across countries regarding industries’ relative sizes within them. Bioindustry is used as 
the denominator in both cases to produce estimates that are less sensitive to extreme high values of the 
chemindustry variable.  
Models 1 and 2 are each tested against two forms of the weapontype dependent variable: one in 
which there are four categories, C, B, R, or N (Models 1A and 2A); and one in which R and N are collapsed 
into a single category (Models 1B and 2B). The logic for doing so is two-fold. From a practical perspective, 
there is no publicly available codebook for the Monterey WMD Database that could define how nuclear 
and radiological attacks were coded. Within the available literature, radiological terrorism is understood to 
refer to the dispersion of radioactive materials, and nuclear terrorism is understood to mean terrorists’ use 
of nuclear fusion or fission to produce an atomic implosion or explosion. The Monterey WMD Database’s 
inclusion of “nuclear” as an outcome with 42 observations is thus suspect, since in none of these cases did 
a nuclear incident, according to the conventional understanding of the term, take place. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it is possible that the available proxy variables, radindustry and nuclearindustry, will not clearly 
distinguish between nuclear and radiological “industry,” since they both pertain to a country’s nuclear 
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Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
 
weapontype type of weapon used in terrorism incident; either with four outcomes (C, B, 
R, or N) or three outcomes, with radiological and nuclear combined (C, B, or 
R + N) 
bioindustry annual pharmaceutical exports, in US dollars at current prices, per country 
and year of terrorism incident; a proxy for the country’s life sciences (i.e. 
“biological”) industry 
chemindustry annual chemical exports minus pharmaceutical exports (if reported), in US 
dollars at current prices, per country and year of terrorism incident; a proxy 
for the country’s chemical industry 
nuclearindustry = 1 if target country possesses weapons-usable materials, 0 otherwise; a 
proxy for the country’s nuclear “industry” 
radindustry annual electricity production from nuclear sources, in kilowatt-hours, per 




log of chemindustry divided by bioindustry; log transformation allows 
relative-risk ratio to serve as elasticity of weapontype with respect to this 
ratio; a measure of chemical industry’s size relative to biological industry 
(radindustry 
/bioindustry) 
radindustry divided by bioindustry; a measure of radiological industry’s size 
relative to biological industry 
bureauqual scale coding (0-4) of target country’s bureaucratic strength and its 
bureaucracy’s capacity to withstand governmental changes and maintain 
political autonomy in the year of attack; a proxy for states’ industrial 
regulatory capacity 
industryreg scale coding (1-100) of the degree to which countries have implemented 
UNSCR 1540, current values; a proxy measure for states’ CBRN industry 
regulation 
gdppc GDP per capita in $1000 of dollars per country and year of attack, in 
constant 2000 US dollars; a measure of country wealth 
techdev total energy consumption (megagram of oil equivalent) per capita, for 
country and year of attack; a proxy for level of technological development in 
target country 
corruption ordinal (0 to 6) ranking of corruption within political system, per country 
and year of attack 
log(polity2) log of polity2 (“Revised Combined Polity Score”), an ordinal variable (-10 
to +10) measuring autocracy (negative values) and democracy (positive 
values) for country and year of attack; log transformation allows relative-
risk ratio to serve as elasticity of weapontype with respect to polity2  
religious = 1 if perpetrator is an identified terrorist group with religious motivation, 0 
otherwise 
transnational = 1 if perpetrator is an identified terrorist group with transnational 
orientation, 0 otherwise 
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Models 1 and 2 are each tested against two forms of the weapontype dependent variable: one in 
which there are four categories, C, B, R, or N (Models 1A and 2A); and one in which R and N are collapsed 
into a single category (Models 1B and 2B). The logic for doing so is two-fold. From a practical perspective, 
there is no publicly available codebook for the Monterey WMD Database that could define how nuclear 
and radiological attacks were coded. Within the available literature, radiological terrorism is understood to 
refer to the dispersion of radioactive materials, and nuclear terrorism is understood to mean terrorists’ use 
of nuclear fusion or fission to produce an atomic implosion or explosion. The Monterey WMD Database’s 
inclusion of “nuclear” as an outcome with 42 observations is thus suspect, since in none of these cases did 
a nuclear incident, according to the conventional understanding of the term, take place. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it is possible that the available proxy variables, radindustry and nuclearindustry, will not clearly 
distinguish between nuclear and radiological “industry,” since they both pertain to a country’s nuclear 
energy production capacity. 
 Finally, the more comprehensive Model 2 is tested against two subsets of observations: hoaxes and 
pranks (Model 2C) versus only “serious” terrorism incidents (Model 2D). The latter is tested using the 
four-outcome dependent variable based on the findings of Models 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B (discussed below), 
which demonstrate meaningful differences between terrorists’ choice of radiological or nuclear weapons. 
Model 2C is tested using a general logit regression with only two dependent variable outcomes: biological 
and chemical. Radiological and nuclear incidents were dropped from the sample, as their low frequency—
1 and 3 observations respectively—prevented the application of a multinomial logit regression. Tests 
indicate that the models do not exhibit any significant heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity.  
Results and Analysis 
 
Findings Across Differing Arrangements of the Dependent Variable 
 
Models 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B yielded robust results. Given the degree to which human agency can be assumed 
to play a role in terrorists’ weapon choice, the models’ explanatory power— pseudo r-squared at 0.177, 
0.179, 0.201, and 0.197 respectively—is fairly high. Results for Models 1A and 2A, with the dependent 
variable weapontype comprising four categories—C, B, R, or N—are presented in Table 3. Results for 
Models 1B and 2B—with three weapontype categories, C, B, or R + N—are presented in Table 4.  
Hypothesis 1: Weapon Type and Related Industry 
 
The data provide mixed support for the technological determinist hypothesis. In distinguishing between 
chemical and biological incidents, the results are compelling: in Model 2A, a one unit increase in 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry) results in a 42.1% (42.5% in Model 2B) increase in the likelihood of a 
chemical attack as opposed to a biological one. The practical significance of this value is quite large, given 
the variable’s statistical dispersion: a country with the highest logged ratio will be nearly four and a half 
times more likely to experience chemical attacks over biological ones than a country with the smallest 
proportion of biological to chemical industry. 
The data are less clear with respect to nuclear and radiological terrorism. The 
radindustry/bioindustry ratio only approached significance (p = 0.073) for radiological incidents in Model 
2A. Additionally, at 1.002, the RRR bears little practical significance (only 0.002%) in determining the 
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Weapon Type – C, B, R, or N 
 
 Model 1A Model 2A 























gdppc 0.980 0.145 0.928 0.000 
techdev 0.876 0.015 0.836 0.005 
log(polity2) 1.638 0.341 6.453 0.014 
corruption 1.888 0.000 1.382 0.028 
bureauqual 0.543 0.007 0.861 0.614 
industryreg 0.997 0.723 1.001 0.963 
transnational 8.741 0.000 8.471 0.000 
religious 4.064 0.000 3.906 0.002 
nuclearindustry   6.422 0.000 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)   1.421 0.028 
radindustry/bioindustry   0.998 0.116 
















gdppc 0.976 0.586 0.993 0.911 
techdev 0.942 0.716 0.870 0.537 
log(polity2) 0.576 0.507 2.084 0.667 
corruption 1.496 0.227 1.459 0.380 
bureauqual 0.269 0.008 0.154 0.010 
industryreg 1.026 0.247 1.033 0.260 
transnational 3.638 0.017 3.314 0.069 
religious 5.543 0.054 5.186 0.091 
nuclearindustry   2.932 0.262 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)   0.008 0.983 
radindustry/bioindustry   0.999 0.636 



















gdppc 1.035 0.185 1.022 0.554 
techdev 0 .706 0.001 0.629 0.000 
log(polity2) 0 .261 0.044 5.504 0.277 
corruption 0 .552 0.012 0.365 0.000 
bureauqual 0 .866 0.684 1.550 0.394 
industryreg 1.037 0.023 1.018 0.468 
transnational 4.300 0.000 3.216 0.029 
religious 3.826 0.021 5.552 0.008 
nuclearindustry   2.785 0.148 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)   1.071 0.798 
radindustry/bioindustry   1.002 0.073 
Constant 3.640 0.325 0.007 0.150 
 Number of observations 1246 1106 
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo r-squared 0.177 0.201 
Log likelihood -938.239 -765.723 
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The indicator nuclearindustry generated unexpected results: in Model 2A, it was not a significant 
determinant of nuclear or radiological incidents with any base outcome, but it did have a surprisingly strong 
effect (RRR = 6.421) on the likelihood of chemical over biological terrorism. That is, the presence of 
weapons-usable nuclear materials in a country made chemical terrorism nearly five and a half times more 
likely than biological terrorism. In Model 2B, nuclearindustry was significant for chemical weapons (RRR 
= 6.292) and the nuclear-radiological combination (RRR = 3.205), demonstrating that both chemical and 
nuclear or radiological attacks are more likely than biological attacks when a country possesses nuclear 
weapons-usable materials.  
 While stronger proxy measures for radiological and nuclear industry would be required to 
conclusively confirm or disconfirm Hypothesis 1A, the findings for log(chemindustry/bioindustry) indicate 
that terrorists’ choice in weapon is, at least in some cases,  linked to related industrial capacity. 
Hypothesis 2: Regulatory Capacity and Proliferation Potential 
 
The models generate convincing support for Hypothesis 2 regarding a continuum of proliferation potential 
and states’ regulatory capacity. In Model 1A, bureauqual is significant and with the smallest RRR (= 0.269) 
for nuclear industry (note that when RRR < 1, the closer it is to 0, the larger its negative likelihood of 
occurring). The RRR is even closer to 0 (RRR = 0.154) when controlling for Model 2A’s industry variables. 
As states’ bureaucratic quality increases, nuclear attacks thus retain only between 15.4 and 26.9 percent 
chances of occurring, relative to biological attacks, which—assuming the order of proliferation potential in 
the continuum is accurate (i.e. biological agents are most difficult to regulate, and nuclear agents are most 
easily regulated)—confirms the hypothesis that higher state regulatory capacity corresponds to the use of 
the most difficultly regulated CBRN agents. 
Bureauqual is significant with a moderately-sized, smaller-than-one RRR (0.543) for chemical 
incidents in Model 1A, thus placing chemical terrorism accurately on the continuum between the poles of 
biological and nuclear. While bureauqual does not generate significant coefficients for radiological attacks 
with biological as the regression’s base outcome (implying that it is not statistically different from 
biological, and thus—as the hypothesis suggests—difficult to regulate), when the base case is switched to 
radiological (i.e. when RRRs are made to represent relationships between the corresponding weapon type 
and radiological incidents), a significant bureauqual coefficient for nuclear incidents demonstrates that 
radiological terrorism would lie close to biological (toward the “difficult to regulate” pole) on the 
continuum. When nuclear and radiological incidents are collapsed into a single category, Model 1B also 
demonstrates that biological agents are more difficult to regulate than chemical agents. The insignificant 
coefficient for the combination of radiological and nuclear incidents provides implicit support for 
Hypothesis 2, since radiological and nuclear agents are not adjacent to one another on the proliferation 
continuum; their combined relationship relative to the other two weapon types should be ambiguous if the 
continuum and hypothesis are correct.  
Hypothesis 3: Determinants of CBRN Over Conventional Weapons 
 
Contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 3, some of the regime and perpetrator characteristics previously 
identified as significant determinants of CBRN over conventional terrorism were not only significant, but 
with large magnitudes. 
Most notably, perpetrator characteristics—transnational and religious—were consistently, across 
nearly all dependent variable outcomes in Models 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B, statistically significant and with 
RRRs ranging from 3.104 (transnational for nuclear incidents in Model 2B) to 8.753 (transnational for 
chemical incidents in Model 1B). While there was slight variation between models and across C, B, R, or 
N outcomes regarding which of the two perpetrator variables had the strongest influence on terrorist’s 
choice in weapon, a clear trend emerged: both transnationally-oriented and religiously-motivated terrorists 
were significantly less likely to employ biological weapons than other weapon types.  
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The low likelihood of transnationally-oriented groups to pursue biological terrorism can be linked 
with the proliferation continuum, and lends support to the technological determinist hypothesis. Since 
biological agents are difficult to regulate, they are presumably more prevalent in a wider range of states and 
more readily available to actors within these states. Transnational terrorist groups, however, “are in a more 
competitive news market than domestic terrorists and this induces [them] to seek more ghastly actions” 
(Ivanova and Sandler, 2007, p. 282). While Ivanova and Sandler make this claim to support a hypothesis 
that transnational terrorists would be more inclined to pursue CBRN over conventional weapons, such 
competition for media attention might produce a disincentive toward using biological weapons, since they 
are presumably the most common CBRN weapon type (comprising 56.95% of all observations).  
The available literature does not appear to present any meaningful reason for which religiously-
motivated terrorists would be unlikely to pursue biological terrorism. In fact, this result runs contrary to 
experience with Al Qaeda, arguably the best-known religious and transnational terrorist group: before his 
death, Osama bin Laden had pursued the development of unconventional weapons—including, supposedly, 
biological weapons—as “a religious duty” (as cited in Yusufzai, 1999). It is likely that the above-described 
findings regarding religious groups and biological terrorism result from a confounding factor: the high 
prevalence of biological hoaxes in the sample, and the high likelihood that religious terrorists will perpetrate 
serious attacks more often than hoaxes. Biological incidents comprised 93.82% (729 of 777) of hoaxes, 
compared with 13.15% (86 of 654) of serious attacks; and religious-motivated terrorists perpetrated only 
0.65% (5 of 768) of hoaxes, compared with 15.90% (104 of 550) of serious attacks. Since hoaxes are very 
likely to be biological, and religious-motivated terrorists are less likely to perpetrate hoaxes than serious 
attacks, it misleadingly appears that religious-motivated terrorists are unlikely to use biological weapons. 
Indeed, when hoaxes and pranks are controlled for (i.e. a hoax or prank indicator is added to Model 2), the 
significance of the coefficients for religious in every case is eliminated. Transnational, on the other hand, 
remains robust, and so the spurious argument does not challenge the above-described relationship with 
respect to transnational terrorists. 
The RRRs for gdppc are also of note. In Model 2A, a smaller-than-one RRR of gdppc for chemical 
relative to biological incidents (0.928) suggests that biological is more likely than chemical terrorism when 
country wealth is high. When the base outcome is switched to chemical, radiological becomes 10% more 
likely than chemical terrorism when country wealth is high. This relationship between both biological and 
radiological incidents and high gdppc may be highlighting a weakness of the related industry measures: 
since life sciences or “biological industry” in addition to radiological capacity can be presumed to be 
generally more advanced in richer countries, it is possible that gdppc may be capturing the effects of related 
industries that this study’s limited industry proxies fail to encompass. 
Overall, the surprising statistical significance of many previously-identified determinants of CBRN 
over conventional weapons in determining C, B, R, or N suggests that treating CBRN as a general category 
may obscure important differences regarding the determinants of unconventional weapon type use.  
Hypothesis 1 Revisited: Hoaxes and Pranks versus Serious Attacks 
 
When separating hoaxes and pranks from serious attacks (results presented in Appendix, Table A5), the 
industry explanatory variables of Model 2, based on pseudo r-squared values, performed better for hoaxes 
than for non-hoaxes. While the comparison between the two models is not perfect, given that only two 
weapon types were assessed in the hoax sample, it generates results consistent with Rowlands, Littlewood, 
and Kilberg’s (2012) findings that CBRN hoaxes are most likely to be biological, and actual attacks are 
most often chemical. That industry and regulation variables lack significance for all types of serious attack 
suggests that terrorists are not induced to actually employ particular weapons simply because they are more 
easily-accessed, nor are they dissuaded by difficulty in access imposed by regulation: those who aspire to 
perpetrate serious CBRN incidents will actively seek the weapon type they desire. While Hypothesis 1A is 
confirmed for the entire sample including hoaxes and serious attacks (since the former are more 
predominant in the sample than the latter), its null hypothesis cannot be rejected for serious attack 
perpetrators on their own.  
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While perpetrators of hoaxes and pranks appear quick to “imagine away” potential regulatory 
barriers (both bureauqual and industryreg are significant and positive predictors of chemical over biological 
incidents, contrary to the earlier findings of a proliferation continuum in the alternate direction), they are 
less imaginative when it comes to the type of weapon they imitate: with every 100% increase in 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)—that is, as chemindustry becomes increasingly large relative to 
bioindustry—the likelihood of a chemical over biological hoax or prank increases by more than three and 
a half (RRR = 4.573) times. The data thus support the alternate hypothesis to 1B: related industry has a 
greater influence on the weapon choice of hoaxers and pranksters than of serious attack perpetrators. In 
other words, the widely held technological deterministic hypothesis, while seemingly false for perpetrators 
of serious attacks, appears to be internalized by hoaxers and pranksters who may draw on the availability 
of technology and knowledge to make their claims and acts more believable. 
That such counterintuitive results—with important policy implications—are found when the total 
sample of observations includes hoaxes and pranks in addition to serious attacks casts serious doubt on the 
utility of Ivanova and Sandler’s (2006; 2007) culling of the Monterey dataset. Especially given that policy 
responses are initiated whether or not a supposed terrorist attack is eventually uncovered as a hoax, it is 
imperative for future study to uncover any systematic differences that might assist in the early identification 
of which “attacks” are hoaxes, and which may go on to exact a human toll; such inferences cannot be drawn 
from a sample of serious attacks alone. 
Conclusions 
 
This study has demonstrated that the technological determinism hypothesis holds only under certain 
circumstances. For serious attack perpetrators, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. For perpetrators of 
hoaxes and pranks, and within the broader sample of all CBRN incidents, the hypothesis holds strongly 
with respect to chemical and biological weapons. The fortunate lack of existing empirical evidence 
precludes the extension of this finding to radiological and nuclear hoaxes. Stronger proxy measures for 
radiological and nuclear industry—as well as a greater frequency of radiological and nuclear hoaxes—
would be required for the technological determinist hypothesis for all CBRN categories to be conclusively 
assessed. Given the degree to which present policy in Canada and other countries is premised on the 
technological determinism hypothesis, such further study is necessary. While measures for chemical and 
biological industry appear to perform well, findings for the effect of country wealth, gdppc, suggest that 
pharmaceutical exports as a proxy for life sciences (i.e. biological) industry may underestimate the size of 
a country’s true “biological” industry, and thus exaggerate findings for ratios using this measure as a 
denominator.  
 Regression results for the entire sample support the hypothesis of a continuum of proliferation 
potential, with biological being the most difficult to regulate, followed by radiological, chemical, and 
nuclear proliferation: biological weapons are the most—and nuclear the least—likely weapons to be used 
when a state’s regulatory capacity is high. The hypothesis does not, however, hold for the sample of serious 
attacks only, suggesting that terrorists who aspire to perpetrate serious CBRN incidents will actively seek 
the weapon type they desire, irrespective of regulatory constraints and ease of access.  
 The study also finds significant results for regime and perpetrator characteristics previously 
identified as significant determinants of CBRN over conventional weapons when applied to the likelihood 
of C, B, R, or N. The most notable of these characteristics are country wealth and perpetrator groups’ 
transnational orientation. These findings suggest that further research into the likelihood of C, B, R, or N—
rather than the previously emphasized likelihood of CBRN as a category compared with conventional 
terrorism—will be fruitful.  
 Ultimately, these findings support policy action in accordance with what Koblentz (2011) describes 
as “pragmatic”—as opposed to optimistic and pessimistic—prescriptions for CBRN terrorism. While the 
threat of CBRN terrorism is real, the lack of predictability for serious attack weapon type based on existing 
knowledge makes it difficult to tailor security responses to particular CBRN outcomes. Rather, 
policymakers should “provide protection against a broad spectrum of deliberate and national hazards” and 
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address “the conditions that enable terrorists to pursue CBRN weapons” (Koblentz, 2011, p. 504). 
Furthermore, policymakers would be wise to consider the evidence provided in this paper against the 
technological determinist hypothesis for serious CBRN incidents: as long as policymakers adhere to these 
beliefs, they will be more susceptible to believing hoaxes and pranks informed by the same logic. If 
technological determinism performed historically to induce terrorists’ use of CBRN weapons, globalized 
networks and economies—that is, Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer’s (2012) “economic embeddedness” 
effect—have spread to such an extent that relying on these explanations to inform policy is unlikely to 
generate favourable outcomes.   
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Table A4: summary of Control Variables Collected Based on Previous Studies’ 
 
Variable Name Results from Previous Studies (CBRN vs. Conventional Attack) 
Country Wealth 
(gdppc) 
Significant positive predictor of CBRN (Ivanova and Sandler, 2007) 
Democracy 
(polity2) 
Significant positive predictor of CBRN (Ivanova and Sandler, 2007). Note: While 
Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer (2012) use the polity2 score, Ivanova and Sandler 
(2006; 2007) use only Polity’s “institutionalized democracy” variable. Polity2 is 
used here since, as a combination of democracy and autocracy elements, it is more 
comprehensive than the democracy score alone. Furthermore, it converts instances 
of “standardized authority scores” (i.e. -66 for foreign “interruption”; -77 for cases 
of anarchy; and -88 for transitional periods) to conventional scores, therefore not 
negatively skewing results or requiring the elimination of observations for which 
standardized scores are recorded from the analysis. 
Corruption 
(corruption) 
Inverse of corruption (i.e. regime honesty) found to be a significant negative 




Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer (2012) did not find significant results for this 
measure, on the assumption that its effects were subsumed under their “McDonald’s 
Effect” measure for a country’s embeddedness in the global economy. Since that 
measure was publically unavailable over the period of time required, this variable is 





Ivanova and Sandler (2007) found that religious cults were a large and significant 
predictor of CBRN attacks. However, these findings are based on a flawed 
methodology, and false distinction between religiously-motivated cults and 
fundamentalists (of the 314 observations under study, only 28 were perpetrated 
by cults, and all but one were perpetrated by a single cult: Aum Shinrikyo. It is 
misleading to extrapolate findings from this group to the entire category of 





Ivanova and Sandler (2007) found transnational orientation to be a significant 
predictor of CBRN only for religious fundamentalists (they introduce an interaction 
term that multiplies transnational orientation with religious motivation – it is not 
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Table A5: Results for Logit Regression on Hoaxes and Pranks and Multinomial Regression on Serious 
Incidents 
 
 Model 2C - Hoaxes Model 2D - Serious 






















gdppc 0.918 0.033 0.939 0.063 
techdev 0.653 0.002 0.970 0.780 
log(polity2) 8.698 0.812 9.054 0.112 
corruption 0.571 0.196 1.615 0.056 
bureauqual 18.342 0.011 0.545 0.258 
industryreg 1.141 0.015 1.001 0.970 
transnational 11.095 0.001 2.004 0.140 
religious 2.117 0.676 0.863 0.793 
nuclearindustry 59.798 0.003 3.094 0.156 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry) 4.573 0.002 0.850 0.557 
radindustry/bioindustry 0.999 0.939 0.998 0.292 
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corruption   1.238 0.661 
bureauqual   0.180 0.063 
industryreg   1.046 0.240 
transnational   0.829 0.799 
religious   1.271 0.816 
nuclearindustry   2.281 0.507 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)   0.754 0.532 
radindustry/bioindustry   0.999 0.522 

















 gdppc   1.019 0.690 
techdev   0.741 0.043 
log(polity2)   14.784 0.272 
corruption   0.469 0.023 
bureauqual   0.959 0.952 
industryreg   1.031 0.357 
transnational   0.856 0.801 
religious   1.146 0.849 
nuclearindustry   1.618 0.613 
log(chemindustry/bioindustry)   0.743 0.392 
/bioindustry   1.002 0.338 
Constant   0.011 0.383 
 Number of observations 688 414 
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo r-squared 0.155 0.133 
Log likelihood -119.344 -339.138 
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